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A B S T R A C T
Biodiversity oﬀsets seek to counterbalance loss of biodiversity due to major developments by generating
equivalent biodiversity beneﬁts elsewhere, resulting, at least in theory, in ‘no net loss’ (or even a ‘net positive
gain’) in biodiversity. While local costs of major developments themselves receive signiﬁcant attention, the local
costs of associated biodiversity oﬀsets have not. In low income countries, where local populations often depend
heavily on natural resources and access to land for their livelihoods, the conservation restrictions introduced
around biodiversity oﬀsets can have signiﬁcant local costs. We consider the international standards which un-
derpin the development of biodiversity oﬀsets around the world and look at the biodiversity oﬀset programme of
the Ambatovy nickel mine in eastern Madagascar: a company at the vanguard of biodiversity oﬀset development.
Using document review and interviews with key international and national stakeholders (as well as previous
ﬁeldwork on local impacts of the Ambatovy biodiversity oﬀset) we identify a mismatch between policies which
make clear commitments to avoiding harm to local people, and somewhat weaker implementation on the
ground. We explore this policy-practice gap and suggest that it is due to: 1) diﬀerent interpretations of the
meaning of international standards, 2) weak incentives for companies to comply with policies, 3) separation of
responsibilities for social and environmental impacts of interventions in operating companies, 4) assumptions
that conservation is a ‘good thing’ causing reduced scrutiny of biodiversity oﬀsets relative to other activities of
major developments. Biodiversity oﬀsets are resulting in a rapid increase in protected areas funded by cor-
porations (and their international lenders). Many conservation projects in low income countries have local costs.
The existence of stringent standards which recognise these costs in the case of biodiversity oﬀset projects is very
positive. Biodiversity oﬀsets have the potential to be a successful addition to the conservationist’s toolkit but the
real challenges of addressing the local costs of this novel conservation approach need to be resolved.
1. Introduction
Biodiversity oﬀsets seek to compensate for the damage to biodi-
versity caused by developments such as mines, dams or roads by
creating an ‘ecologically equivalent’ beneﬁt elsewhere (Quétier and
Lavorel, 2011). They are seen as a mechanism to allow economically
important infrastructure which can contribute to human development
to be built while ensuring, at least in theory, that ‘no net loss’, or even
‘net positive gain’, in biodiversity is achieved (Bull et al., 2013; Gardner
et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2016a,b). Their use is rapidly expanding, with
many countries having national level policies (Maron et al., 2016a,b;
IUCN, The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2018) and a growing number of
companies having made voluntary commitments to oﬀset their un-
avoidable biodiversity impacts (Rainey et al., 2015). Lender
requirements are also increasingly driving their use: since 2012 oﬀsets
have been mandated wherever a development ﬁnanced by institutions
applying International Finance Corporation standards aﬀects an area of
high biodiversity importance (IFC, 2012a, p2 PS6). Despite this rapid
spread, their use remains controversial (Ives and Bekessy, 2015).
There is a sizable academic literature focusing on the challenges of
ensuring that biodiversity oﬀsets deliver on their promises in terms of
biodiversity conservation itself (Bull et al., 2015; Bull et al., 2017;
Curran et al., 2014; Maron et al., 2015a; Maron et al., 2015b; Virah-
Sawmy et al., 2014; Watson et al., 2010). However, biodiversity oﬀsets
also pose important social challenges. There has been criticism that
they fail to take account of the unique, place-based values which sites
may hold; instead treating sites as equivalent if their biodiversity va-
lues, as deﬁned by experts, are equivalent (Hannis and Sullivan, 2012;
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Ives and Bekessy, 2015; Robertson, 2000; Scholte et al., 2016). There is
also a rich and rapidly growing literature critiquing the concept of
biodiversity oﬀsets from the perspective of political economy; empha-
sising the equity implications of the distributions of the new environ-
mental values which biodiversity oﬀsets create through the commodi-
ﬁcation of nature (Neimark and Wilson, 2015; Robertson, 2000, 2004,
2011; Sullivan, 2013; Sullivan and Hannis, 2015; Vaissière et al., 2017).
For example, where threats to biodiversity come from the livelihood
activities of poor local stakeholders such as agricultural expansion,
hunting or wild-product harvesting (as is often the case in low income
countries) biodiversity oﬀsets which seek to reduce these threats will
bring local costs (Kraemer, 2012; Seagle, 2012; Bidaud et al. 2017). In
fact a recent study suggests that a third of oﬀsets displace people and
negatively aﬀect livelihoods (Sonter et al., 2018). Such local costs of
conservation-related land use restrictions are well recognised in the
context of protected areas (Brockington and Wilkie, 2015; Holmes and
Cavanagh, 2016; Oldekop et al., 2016), but the extent to which biodi-
versity oﬀset schemes consider and mitigate the local costs of their
conservation activities has not been extensively studied.
A company carrying out a major infrastructure development, as well
as following its own company policy and the laws of the country, will
have to follow the standards set by its lender. The performance stan-
dards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are increasingly
inﬂuential and apply not only to IFC-funded investment but also in-
vestment in low income countries from any ﬁnancial institutions who
have signed up to the Equator Principles (a voluntary set of standards
for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental
risks; Anon., 2013). IFC Performance Standard 6 mandates biodiversity
oﬀsets in certain circumstances (Maron et al., 2016a,b) and is likely to
drive further spread of biodiversity oﬀsetting. The IFC recommends that
projects follow the guidance on biodiversity oﬀsets provided by the
Business and Biodiversity Oﬀsets Partnership or BBOP (IFC, 2012a), an
international collaboration between companies, ﬁnancial institutions,
government agencies and civil society organisations to develop best
practice in biodiversity oﬀsets. The IFC standards themselves provide
explicit guidance on mitigating local costs of infrastructure develop-
ment projects for aﬀected communities (IFC, 2012a). However, there
has been limited research looking at how the potential local costs of
biodiversity oﬀsets are considered across the available standards, and
how these are interpreted by those involved in the design and im-
plementation of schemes.
Madagascar is a country with very high biodiversity (Myers et al.,
2000) and extreme poverty (World Bank, no date). The mining sector is
expanding rapidly (Canavesio, 2014) and the country has two very high
proﬁle internationally-funded mining developments (QMM-Rio Tinto
and Ambatovy) which have publicly declared they have achieved re-
spectively net gain (Temple et al., 2012) or no net loss (von Hase et al.,
2014) of biodiversity. A recent study (Bidaud et al., 2017) investigated
the local impacts of the oﬀsets implemented by Ambatovy. This shows
that while the development activities associated with the oﬀset were
positive and well-received locally, those beneﬁting were often not the
same people as those bearing the cost due to restrictions to land access
and natural resource use. Overall Bidaud et al. (2017) illustrate that
some very poor people have lost out as a result of the oﬀset.
In this paper we review how the potential local costs from biodi-
versity oﬀsets implemented in low income countries are considered in
international standards and how these standards are interpreted by
stakeholders. Using the case of Madagascar’s national policies towards
biodiversity oﬀsets, and the implementation of the oﬀsets carried out by
Ambatovy, we then argue that while international standards, and their
incorporation into national policies, both make clear the need for local
costs to be mitigated, this does not always happen in practice. We use
detailed interviews with international and national stakeholders to
explore the reasons for this gap between policy and practice. We oﬀer
recommendations for how the implementation of biodiversity oﬀsets
can be improved to ensure potential negative impacts on local people
are mitigated.
2. Methods
2.1. Review of international standards, national and company policies for
biodiversity oﬀsets
We reviewed the IFC Performance Standards and BBOP Standards
(to which the Ambatovy mine has signed up), noting the commitment
to biodiversity oﬀsets, the way in which local costs are considered
(focusing especially on the impacts on livelihood, on poverty and vul-
nerability and equity issues), and the requirement for compensating
local people for economic displacement. In relation to equity, we
mainly discuss the distributive dimension, with less attention to con-
textual and procedural dimensions (McDermott et al., 2013).
We reviewed Madagascar’s national policies with relevance to bio-
diversity oﬀsets including the Mining Code (2005) and its revision
(draft dated March 2016), the law regarding the impact of large in-
vestments on the environment (the MECIE decree, 2004), environ-
mental policies governing decentralization of natural resource man-
agement (GELOSE 1996 and GCF 2001), and the Protected Area Code
(République de Madagascar, 2015).
We reviewed publicly available information from Ambatovy, such
as their environmental impact assessment, annual reports to the
National Environment Oﬃce (ONE), sustainability reports, BBOP re-
ports, and monthly newsletters.
2.2. Interviews with key stakeholders
We conducted semi-structured interviews with international stake-
holders expected to be well-informed about biodiversity oﬀsets because
they were involved in developing biodiversity oﬀset standards, engaged
in the debate around biodiversity oﬀsets, or implementing biodiversity
oﬀset schemes in low income countries. Informants were selected to
reﬂect the range of international stakeholders involved in the design
and implementation of schemes: lenders, consultants, international
conservation NGOs and academics. We targeted experienced and rela-
tively senior people who had often authored inﬂuential documents or
play a decision-making role in their organisation. We developed an
initial list of individuals and organisations we would like to interview
based on our extensive reading in this area. We built on this list during
the research process as those approached to interview (both those who
accepted and those who declined) often suggested additional contacts.
After background checks to ensure these suggested people met our
criteria, they were approached. In total we attempted to contact 60
international stakeholders for interview, but some did not respond to
our contact, passed us onto someone else within their organisation, or
felt they were not qualiﬁed to answer our questions. A total of 30 in-
terviews were carried out between August 2015 and May 2016 (coded
from IS01 to IS30 in Appendix A in Supplementary material, and where
quotes are presented in the text). Interviews were conducted mostly
face to face (in Washington, London, Cambridge and at an International
Conference in Montpellier) but some were conducted over skype.
Interviews covered: interpretation of IFC standards, experience of bio-
diversity oﬀset implementation, who should be considered as ‘aﬀected
by the project’, and how costs and beneﬁts should be distributed (for
full details of the interview guide see Appendix A in Supplementary
material). At the end of the interview we presented the results from our
earlier research exploring the impact of the biodiversity oﬀsets in the
Ambatovy case study in Madagascar on local people (Bidaud et al.,
2017). This research shows a signiﬁcant gap between the standards and
their implementation as, while the micro-development projects im-
plemented as part of the scheme are well received, they deliver too
small beneﬁts, too late and not targeted to the people bearing the
greatest cost. After presenting these results we asked interviewees for
their perceptions of the reasons for the existence of this gap.
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We also conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with national
stakeholders working at regional and national levels in Madagascar in
the mining, development and conservation sectors with experience of
biodiversity oﬀsets (coded NS01 to NS20 in Appendix A in
Supplementary material). These interviews were all carried out face-to-
face in Madagascar in October and November 2014, February and
March 2015 and in January 2016. Because it was not possible to agree
the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding between Ambatovy and
Bangor University with respect to publication of research results, we
could not interview Ambatovy staﬀ.
All interviews were conducted in English or French, recorded using
an MP3 recorder, transcribed and coded in NVivo by CB. CB is a native
French speaker and ﬂuent in English. The research was approved under
the Bangor University research ethics framework. We do not give in-
formation which allows individual quotes to be attributed to our re-
spondents.
2.3. Introduction to the Ambatovy case study
Ambatovy is a nickel and cobalt mining company representing the
largest ever investment in Madagascar (over 7 USD billion) and one of
the largest in sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean region
(Ambatovy, 2014). Ambatovy estimates that its contributions to the
Government of Madagascar will be US$ 50 million per year for the next
ten years and total US$ 4.5 billion in taxes, royalties, duties, and other
payments over the 29 year lifetime of the mine2. Nickel is predicted to
be among Madagascar’s most valuable exports and to bring a large
amount of tax revenue to this very poor country.
As well as bringing jobs and much needed tax revenue, the mine is
also destroying 2065 ha of natural forest (which provides critical ha-
bitat for globally threatened species) both in the mine footprint and
along a 220 km pipeline moving material from the mine to the coast for
export (von Hase et al., 2014). Ambatovy launched a biodiversity oﬀset
programme early in its development to compensate the negative im-
pacts on forest and “deliver no net loss and preferably a net gain, of bio-
diversity” (Ambatovy and BBOP, 2009). The Ambatovy oﬀset portfolio
(see Fig. 1) comprises a range of protected areas including the recently
created Corridor Forestier Analamay Mantadia, and older protected
areas (Ankerana and Torotofotsy). Some areas are contiguous with the
mine footprint (mine concession conservation zone and Torotofotsy)
but Ankerana is 70 km away on an outcrop of similar soil type (von
Hase et al., 2014). Much of the area in which the biodiversity oﬀsets are
implemented is diﬃcult to access and remote, people have a generally
low level of literacy and distrust of the state is common (Bidaud et al.,
2017).
3. Results
3.1. Biodiversity oﬀset standards and policies relating to local costs
3.1.1. International standards
In the case of project-related land acquisitions and restrictions on
land use, Performance Standard 5 of the IFC is very clear that anyone
who is displaced physically or economically (this includes people whose
livelihood must shift due to the implementation of IFC-funded con-
servation) should be compensated for their loss. “When displacement
[includes economic displacement and physical displacement] cannot be
avoided, the client will oﬀer displaced communities and persons compen-
sation for loss of assets at full replacement cost and other assistance to help
them improve or restore their standards of living or livelihoods” (IFC, 2012a,
p3 PS5). In IFC Performance Standard 6 (which covers impacts of de-
velopment on biodiversity and which introduces the requirement for
biodiversity oﬀsets), there is a suggestion that clients ‘may’ compensate
local stakeholders for the loss of access to land or resources resulting
from biodiversity oﬀsets: “In addition, where socioeconomic and cultural
uses of biodiversity (i.e., ecosystem services) are at issue, biodiversity oﬀsets
may include the provision of compensation packages for Aﬀected Commu-
nities impacted by the development project and oﬀset” (IFC, 2012b, Gui-
dance Note 6, GN31 p11). This therefore suggests that those aﬀected by
the biodiversity oﬀset might not be eligible for compensation. However,
guidance notes clarify that biodiversity oﬀsets are also covered by
Performance Standard 5: “Impacts not directly related to land transactions,
such as restrictions on land use resulting from the creation of project-related
buﬀer zones or biodiversity oﬀsets […] should be mitigated and compen-
sated for according to the principles of the Performance Standard” (IFC,
2012b, Guidance Note 5, GN20, p8).
Careful reading of Performance Standards 5 and 6, together with
their guidance notes, therefore makes clear that those negatively af-
fected by biodiversity oﬀsets should be compensated for those costs.
However, inconsistencies between the wording of the two standards
and their guidance notes (use of ‘may’ in PS6 and ‘should’ in PS5) may
lead to confusion among clients and consultants about the extent to
which those aﬀected by biodiversity oﬀsets are eligible for compensa-
tion. Reading PS6 alone could lead to the requirement to compensate
local stakeholders being missed as all relevant details are conﬁned to
the guidance notes of Performance Standard 5.
The BBOP standards acknowledge that biodiversity oﬀsets may have
negative impacts on local stakeholders, and the need to ensure that the
beneﬁts outweigh the costs. The guidance provides methods for de-
termining and comparing costs and beneﬁts, though stating that they
depend very much on the scale of the project, the nature and scale of
the residual impacts and the context. The guidance also acknowledges
the importance of ensuring that such estimates are locally acceptable
and credible (BBOP, 2009, p12).
Both IFC and BBOP highlight the need to consider the needs of the
most vulnerable. As part of the World Bank Group, IFC’s aim is to end
extreme poverty and there are a number of references throughout the
Performance Standards and associated guidance notes to ensuring that
vulnerable people and those in extreme poverty get special considera-
tion. BBOP lists equity (deﬁned as “the sharing among stakeholders of the
rights and responsibilities, risks and rewards associated with a project and
oﬀset in a fair and balanced way”) as one of its key principles. BBOP has
also produced a guide to specify a fair and eﬀective oﬀset package,
which includes consideration of “sub-groups within local stakeholder
groups that need special attention” (BBOP, 2009, p19).
3.1.2. Malagasy national policies
Madagascar’s mining code is under revision and there is no mention
of biodiversity oﬀsets in the work-in-progress version (from March
2016). The social impacts of mines are considered however. Any
company embarking on a new development will be required to conduct
an environmental and social impact assessment (République de
Madagascar, 2016). This is in contrast to the environmental impact
assessment which was required in the previous version of the code
(République de Madagascar, 2005). The National Environment Oﬃce
(ONE) is in charge of issuing permits and monitoring compliance with
companies’ commitments in their impact assessments.
Biodiversity oﬀsets are mentioned in the 2015 protected area
management code. In order to proceed with development within a
protect area, companies will have to apply to declassify the protected
area and to identify areas of a similar size in a similar ecosystem and
with similar levels of biodiversity to actively conserve as a biodiversity
oﬀset (République de Madagascar, 2015). While most natural forests in
Madagascar are covered by some form of legal protection, few of these
are eﬀectively managed or have sustainable funding. This has been used
to justify setting up biodiversity oﬀsets in areas which are already
legally protected (von Hase et al., 2014). Biodiversity oﬀsets are re-
quired to follow the code for protected area management in the same
2 Ambatovy website accessed November 2017 http://www.ambatovy.com/docs/?p=
430
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way as other protected areas. The protected area code explicitly men-
tions that measures must be undertaken by the manager in order to
compensate local stakeholders for the loss of access implied by the new
status of the area (République de Madagascar, 2015). An additional
document (Ministère de l’Environnement de l’Ecologie et des Forêts,
2014) provides more detail and includes the key indicators to ensure
that local stakeholders have been compensated for lost economic op-
portunities due to the new protected area. These guidelines also high-
light the need to speciﬁcally consider the most vulnerable people.
Policies and national guidelines in Madagascar therefore guarantee
the rights of local stakeholders living around a protected area (in-
cluding biodiversity oﬀsets) to access alternative livelihood activities to
compensate for their loss of access to forest resources (Ministère de
l’Environnement de l’Ecologie et des Forêts, 2014). These national po-
licies relating to biodiversity oﬀsets are therefore coherent with inter-
national standards; acknowledging the need to compensate local sta-
keholders for impacts of biodiversity oﬀsets and the need for special
consideration for the poorest people.
3.1.3. Application of international standards and national policies to the
Ambatovy case study
The Ambatovy mine received its environmental permit in 2006 and
is monitored each year under the supervision of the ONE. As it has
funding from a consortium of international development banks, export
credit agencies and commercial banks, Ambatovy is required to follow
the IFC Performance Standards. Its compliance with these standards is
audited regularly by independent third-party experts who represent the
lenders.
Ambatovy joined BBOP in 2006 “to seek guidance for its own op-
erations and, more broadly, to help pioneer and improve best practice
in biodiversity oﬀset design” (von Hase et al., 2014, p18). The BBOP
voluntary standards are seen as very stringent and so following these
also ensures compliance with national laws and international require-
ments (NS10). The company has also been working closely with the
Malagasy government to develop the national laws in both the mining
sector and the environmental sector. For example they were involved in
drafting the standards and norms for social safeguards of new protected
areas (Ministère de l’Environnement de l’Ecologie et des Forêts, 2014).
Early on in the development of their biodiversity oﬀset programme,
Ambatovy identiﬁed that local communities are dependent on natural
resources and that this dependence is the main threat to the forest. They
acknowledged that there would be socio-economic impacts of the oﬀset
project locally and that these would need a carefully designed mitiga-
tion plan: “Biodiversity resources within the mine region have strong in-
trinsic and use values and communities there largely depend on these bio-
diversity resources for their livelihoods. […] The socioeconomic impacts on
the local communities from the project’s oﬀset programme will need to be
considered. The mitigation of these impacts needs to be designed in the
context of national, regional and communal plans that address long-term
issues of sustainable resource use […].” (Ambatovy and BBOP, 2009,
p12).
Ambatovy committed to developing a programme to compensate
local stakeholders for lost access to natural resources around the bio-
diversity oﬀset sites. However, there is no mention of a special pro-
gramme for the poorest or most vulnerable in Ambatovy’s literature.
The mitigation plan involves a diverse range of alternative livelihood
projects such as training in improved agriculture and livestock raising
techniques, providing seeds, tree seedlings and agricultural equipment,
supporting communities in getting tenure of their forests through
community forest management and funding to support community-
based ecological monitoring. At the same time there was also invest-
ment in education and awareness about rules governing natural re-
source access, and funding for local law enforcement agents to come to
the area to enforce the environmental protection rules (von Hase et al.,
2014, p43).
3.2. Evidence for an implementation gap between standards, policy and
practice in the Ambatovy case study
We have demonstrated two main principles regarding the social
impacts of biodiversity oﬀsets arising from the international standards
and national policies. The ﬁrst is that natural resource access restric-
tions should be compensated. The second is that the poorest people
deserve special consideration.
In a study linked to this one, we undertook extensive ﬁeld research
in four sites aﬀected by Ambatovy’s biodiversity oﬀsets to assess the
magnitude and distribution of positive and negative impacts of the
biodiversity oﬀset project on local wellbeing (Bidaud et al., 2017). This
work, conducted between October 2014 and November 2015, involved
extensive qualitative (53 key informant interviews and 29 focus group
discussions) and quantitative (170 household surveys covering the costs
and beneﬁts of the biodiversity oﬀset scheme as experienced by
households) research. We showed that although it acknowledged the
livelihood dependence of local people on natural resources and pro-
vided micro-development projects to support alternative livelihoods,
Ambatovy’s biodiversity oﬀset programme faced critical social issues.
Firstly, though acknowledging the positive impact of some of the de-
velopment projects on their lives, local stakeholders felt that they had
suﬀered a net cost from the biodiversity oﬀset as the beneﬁts from the
alternative livelihood activities did not compensate for the costs of the
conservation restrictions. Secondly those who beneﬁted most from the
development projects were neither those who bore the greatest costs of
forest access restriction nor the poorest people, but tended to be those
with more power locally (Bidaud et al., 2017). We therefore conclude
that the compensation provided through Ambatovy’s biodiversity oﬀset
programme (in the form of alternative livelihood projects) has not
Fig. 1. Responses from international stakeholders to the question: “In IFC standards, local communities directly aﬀected by a development project are called ‘aﬀected
communities’. Does this term also apply to those aﬀected by the oﬀset?” (n=27).
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followed the two principles we identify from the international policies
and national standards.
3.3. Possible reasons for an implementation gap
The standards and policies governing biodiversity oﬀsets demon-
strate that local costs, especially those borne by the poorest, must be
identiﬁed and compensated. Using the case study of the oﬀsets asso-
ciated with the Ambatovy mine in Madagascar, we have illustrated (see
Bidaud et al., 2017) that there is a gap between standards and policies,
and their implementation. When we presented this to international and
national stakeholders, many were not surprised, acknowledging that
“there is always a gap between the plan and what happens” (IS18). From
our extensive interviews with stakeholders we identify four possible
reasons for this implementation gap regarding the general case (bio-
diversity oﬀsets in low income countries) but with a focus on the case of
Ambatovy.
3.3.1. Diﬀerences in the interpretation of standards by stakeholders
Through our review of the international standards relating to bio-
diversity oﬀsets we illustrated that there was some ambiguity in whe-
ther local costs due to economic displacement by a biodiversity oﬀset
should be compensated. Interestingly, when approached for clariﬁca-
tion, IFC themselves did not see any ambiguity and gave a clear re-
sponse that the guidelines concerning economic displacement apply to
those aﬀected by biodiversity oﬀsets: “… PS5 would apply to those
communities/individuals aﬀected by the biodiversity oﬀset created by a
project, if they were to be physically or economically displaced. With respect
to conservation restrictions imposed by biodiversity oﬀsets, the loss of access
to resources would need to be mitigated also in accordance with PS5”
(IS30). However, when we asked international stakeholders whether, in
their understanding, people impacted by an oﬀset should be considered
as “aﬀected communities”, the speciﬁc wording used in the IFC
Performance Standards to refer to those deserving of compensation for
displacement, there was a wide range of views (see Fig. 1).
The most common response was that IFC standards concerning
project aﬀected communities do indeed apply to those aﬀected by
biodiversity oﬀsets: “Yes my understanding is that as for biodiversity im-
pacts and social impacts it is the same thing. Both direct and indirect impacts
are included. The overall project activity includes supply chain and down-
stream activities so there is no reason why biodiversity oﬀsets would be
diﬀerent” (IS28).
However, three interviewees believed otherwise: “I think it is un-
clear but implicit is aﬀected means aﬀected by the direct destructive
activity and not extended to those aﬀected by the biodiversity oﬀset”
(IS27). This view was shared by one of the NGO staﬀ interviewed: “I
guess my interpretation of the language would be that generally
speaking the World Bank and IFC interpret the language as narrowly as
they can justify” (IS09).
Some of these well-informed stakeholders explicitly acknowledged
the disconnection between the theory and the practice. Some people felt
that, although in theory those aﬀected by the biodiversity oﬀset should
be considered aﬀected by the project, in reality they were not treated
that way: “It is a bit complicated, […], I think formally, I think they should
[…] but at the same time I don’t think we necessarily apply the performance
standards to the oﬀset from what I have seen” (IS11). Others felt that
although the wording about aﬀected communities should not apply to
those aﬀected by biodiversity oﬀsets, in practice such communities are
often dealt with in the same way as those aﬀected by the main devel-
opment: “We would not apply the oﬃcial term of aﬀected communities but I
think many of the same principles would apply” (IS18).
Some informants suggested that the local costs of biodiversity oﬀset
schemes are limited or could be avoided by operating in areas which are
already oﬃcially protected: “One of the easiest ways [to implement
biodiversity oﬀsets] is to invest in existing protected areas where we would
hope that social issues or conﬂicting issues related to that area have been
addressed in the past or will be addressed as part of the management pro-
gramme […]” (IS28). This represents an interesting contradiction be-
cause if the conﬂicting issues had been resolved (meaning people must
have moved away from livelihoods dependent on expanding agri-
cultural land or hunting) then there would presumably be limited
biodiversity beneﬁts from the oﬀset.
3.3.2. Weak incentives for applying policies eﬀectively
Because of Ambatovy’s commitment to achieve ‘no net loss of bio-
diversity’ through its biodiversity oﬀsets, the implementation of the
oﬀset scheme supposedly forms part of the compliance audits regularly
conducted by third-party experts who report to the lenders (von Hase
et al., 2014, p4). However, although informants emphasised the re-
quirements of IFC for robust monitoring, they acknowledged that poor
access means that site visits are rare and the auditors rely on the
company’s own monitoring systems: “IFC requires robust monitoring on
biodiversity and social issues. Auditors look for good monitoring systems on
which they can count on results for evaluation. Obviously they do a ﬁeld visit
if they have time” (NS10).
It is clear that although lenders and companies commit to IFC per-
formance standards, lenders are limited in the pressure they can put on
a company once the loan is disbursed, especially if the company is
suﬀering ﬁnancial diﬃculties: “That is something that Ambatovy has to in
principle rectify if they are not in line with the IFC Performance Standards.
[…] However I don’t know how much leverage at this point of time we have
until the ﬁnancial situation resolves itself. […] It needs a strong commitment
behind the oﬀset from government” (IS22).
Ambatovy believes that its “oﬀset programme goes above and beyond
compliance with legal obligations” (Ambatovy and BBOP, 2009, p11).
However, although the oﬀsets were initially a voluntary activity, they
were included in the Environmental Impact Assessment on the basis of
which the company received its environmental permit. Therefore the
conservation of the oﬀset sites (such as the Ankerana protected area) is
part of the legal obligations of Ambatovy toward the Malagasy gov-
ernment and should therefore be subject to regular monitoring. The
extent to which Ambatovy’s oﬀset programme is subject to national
compliance monitoring in the same way as the rest of the mine’s ac-
tivities is however unclear. The management of the Ankerana site is
monitored by Ambatovy and reported to the ONE every year3 but the
ONE itself does not visit this diﬃcult-to-reach area. Interviews with
senior members of ONE staﬀ suggest that they view the biodiversity
oﬀset as a ‘bonus’ (because it was included in the EIA as a voluntary
measure) and so they put more emphasis on monitoring the main
project’s impact. Furthermore, some key national stakeholders consider
that the mining company is not responsible for any social issues arising
from the management of the protected area: “Economic displacement
relates to especially the mine and factory implementation but not to the
conservation project. For the implementation of Corridor Ankeniheny Za-
hamena [the protected area of which Ankerana is part], Conservation
International [the international NGO managing the protected area] is
solving it. So for the protected area implementation there are restrictions.
Responsibility lies with the manager and not Ambatovy. For local people
aﬀected by conservation, Conservation International is in charge” (NS15).
A national stakeholder we interviewed suggested that any failure to
deal with local costs of conservation was due to a failure of local people
to complain “The problem with Malagasy people, they don’t talk to you but
behind your back. When you are around, everything is ﬁne. There is not the
culture of sending a letter to Ambatovy. If you say ‘when you have com-
plaints, go to Ambatovy’s oﬃce’, they do not come” (NS11). However, as
civil society is weak, and rural people aﬀected by development projects
struggle to get their voice heard (Kraemer, 2010), perhaps it is un-
surprising that complaints rarely reach the ear of those in control.
3 Ambatovy annual reports to ONE from 2010 to 2016 are available here http://www.
ambatovy.com/docs/?p=506
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3.3.3. The separation of responsibility for environmental and social impacts
within organisations
In many organisations there is separation between those with en-
vironmental expertise and responsibility and those concerned with so-
cial impacts (whether companies, consultancies, NGOs or within the
National Environment Oﬃce). Biodiversity oﬀsets are usually managed
by the environment team within a company and they may not have the
expertise to consider social impacts. Those in the social team may not
consider that biodiversity oﬀsets come under their remit at all as they
consider it to be a purely environmental intervention. Consultants
specialising in biodiversity oﬀsets are mainly environment specialists.
Hence the consideration of the local costs of conservation activities may
not be adequately considered and any development activities (seeking
to compensate or move livelihoods to more sustainable options) may be
poorly designed. One respondent from an international lender said:
“[The social component] is too weak in biodiversity oﬀsets because only
biologists are working on it. Very often there is no social and community
development expert involved” (IS11). A respondent from an international
conservation NGO said: “I feel like the social impacts are always lagging
behind the biodiversity valuing in terms of oﬀset design” (IS15).
Because local stakeholders’ dependence on natural resources is a
cross-cutting issue between the social and the environmental, con-
sidering them separately may cause problems. Some stakeholders in-
volved in the implementation of biodiversity oﬀsets complained that
they were not encouraged to engage with communities at an early stage
to avoid raising expectations: “I was involved in a project to design a
biodiversity oﬀset and they were paying a lot of attention to the biodiversity
values, habitat… and we said ‘we need to understand communities’ use
values (‘what are they using?’) to make sure that gets integrated into that
calculation. And they said ‘we can’t engage with stakeholders yet because we
don’t want to raise expectations’.” (IS15).
One informant made the point that there is a general tendency for
the evaluation of social impacts of interventions (whether mines or
conservation projects) to lag behind environmental impact evaluation
in Madagascar: “What is sure is that environmental impact assessment has
always been a preoccupation of the international community and in some
way of the Malagasy government. But social impact started later. I don’t
think there are many evaluations of the impact of those projects [….] on
communities. It is surely a weakness of the environmental community, to
have integrated the social component late in the thought process” (IS14).
This is supported by the fact that social impacts were included only
recently into the mining code.
Though many key stakeholders emphasised that the development of
biodiversity oﬀset projects has over-emphasised the biodiversity con-
cerns, there was some suggestion of a shift: “One of the key things was
trying to reduce the emphasis of calculation and accounting [of biodiversity
equivalence] to focus more on engaging with stakeholders and ﬁnding
practical solutions. In some cases, we ﬁnd that we don’t need the accounting
stuﬀ” (IS18).
3.3.4. The assumption that conservation projects are a ‘good thing’
stakeholder interviews suggested that the standards are interpreted
as assuming that the conservation activities of the biodiversity oﬀset are
generally good for everyone concerned: “The standards assume that the
oﬀset is going to be good for people” (IS05); “… when you look at the
description of biodiversity oﬀset in the IFC materials they start by assuming
that the activity implemented will have a beneﬁcial impact not only for
biodiversity but also for people” (IS27).
Some informants were reluctant to talk about negative impacts and
sought to highlight potential local beneﬁts derived from biodiversity
oﬀsets. An informant interviewed after we had presented our work on
local perceptions of the impact of the Ambatovy oﬀsets (Bidaud et al.,
2017) said: “So you make the implicit hypothesis that people are excluded
from their forest. This intrigues me. I would rather think that oﬀsets are
considered as positive for the communities as they allow better management
of the natural resources upon which they depend so I ﬁnd your position
surprising as I would rather think it is a work with the community to protect
the forest” (IS25). Other informants clearly felt that it was not helpful to
think of biodiversity oﬀsets as having negative impacts as the resource
use the oﬀsets seek to prevent is unsustainable and so, in facilitating a
shift to alternative livelihoods, the oﬀset’s conservation actions are
positive in terms of local impacts.
One informant felt strongly that biodiversity oﬀsets should be
viewed as a positive action and that it was somehow unfair to highlight
possible negative impacts: “….we are trying to do something good here and
[local] people are … ‘throwing it up’. It is their fault. They are messing up
something good we are trying to do” (IS23).
4. Discussion
The extent to which conservation funded by biodiversity oﬀsets is
truly additional is an important criticism of the approach (de Freitas
et al., 2017; Koh et al., 2017). If funding for conservation from oﬀsets
displaces other conservation funding (from governments, NGOs or
private donors) then the biodiversity losses from infrastructure devel-
opments are not compensated. The funding of protected areas by bio-
diversity oﬀset schemes is particularly controversial for this reason
(Githiru et al., 2015; Kiesecker et al., 2015; Maron et al., 2015b,
2016a,b; Pilgrim and Bennun, 2014). It is interesting that we have
found stakeholders claiming that there are no local costs of establishing
the biodiversity oﬀsets in the parts of the Ambatovy portfolio which are
legally protected areas, as farming and hunting are already illegal in the
area. There is a clear internal contradiction here. If a site’s protected
area status means it does not face threats, then there are no biodiversity
beneﬁts from the biodiversity oﬀset. If the protected area does in fact
face threats from land encroachment or natural resource extraction
then, by deﬁnition, there will be local costs to changing people’s live-
lihoods away from current activities.
In many low income countries, where biodiversity oﬀsets are in-
creasingly being established (Maron et al., 2015a), local people are
often heavily dependent on natural resources. We have made the case,
based on extensive document review, that international standards
which underpin the development of biodiversity oﬀsets are clear that
impacts on these people should be considered and mitigated. Our pre-
vious work (Bidaud et al., 2017) shows that this is not being achieved.
Although we focus on Ambatovy, we suggest that the case is not iso-
lated. The impacts of the biodiversity oﬀset implemented by Rio Tinto,
the other big mining company operating in Madagascar using biodi-
versity oﬀsets, have also faced criticism about their impact on local
people (Kill and Franchi, 2016; Seagle, 2012). We would suggest that
similar local costs are likely wherever biodiversity oﬀsets generate
biodiversity beneﬁts by preventing land clearance or wildlife use by
local people, but this has not been extensively studied. A current project
is looking at the social impacts of the biodiversity oﬀsets associated
with a major dam in Uganda4.
The ﬁrst reason we suggest for the gap between excellent pro-
gressive policies which clearly consider the potential impacts of bio-
diversity oﬀsets on the poor, and the implementation of these policies,
is simply a lack of understanding of the requirements of the standards
underpinning biodiversity oﬀsets with respect to identifying and miti-
gating local costs. Eﬀective policy implementation requires a shared
understanding of objectives (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). However, in
this case the relevant texts are quite complex with key phrases hidden
in guidance notes rather than explicitly stated in the standards them-
selves. It would be possible for those developing biodiversity oﬀsets to
miss the requirement in the IFC performance standards to consider
those aﬀected by biodiversity oﬀsets in the same way as those aﬀected
by the development itself.
4 https://www.iccs.org.uk/project/achieving-no-net-loss-communities-and-
biodiversity-uganda
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The second reason we suggest for the gap is weak incentives for
applying policies eﬀectively. Consultants have limited time to in-
vestigate complex social issues such as local costs of the oﬀset, and
lenders may not be aware of the issues and have little leverage to im-
pose better monitoring on the borrower (this appears to be the case
with Ambatovy which is in ﬁnancial diﬃculties due to the drop in
nickel price). The state may also have insuﬃcient capacity to properly
conduct the monitoring required to ensure compliance with its own
policies and international standards. A recent review of the im-
plementation of biodiversity oﬀsets in Uganda (Esmail, 2017) has re-
vealed that while responsibility for oversight was held by the govern-
ment of Uganda, no clear plan for implementing the oﬀset was
developed and there was a failure to ensure the commitments both in
terms of environmental and social impacts from the dam project and its
associated oﬀset were met. The lender, in this case the World Bank, are
currently conducting a review. Of course this is not just a problem in
the context of biodiversity oﬀsets: experience from a number of coun-
tries shows similar ﬁndings that lack of eﬀective formal institutions for
monitoring at the government level can result in progressive policies in
the water and forest sectors not being properly implemented (Kairu
et al., 2017; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012). At the same time, the ability of
local communities to demand accountability can be severely limited by
a number of factors such as low levels of education and the lack of a
strong NGO sector (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Rural Malagasy people
living in remote areas may not be aware of their rights and have limited
negotiating power at the national level (Corson, 2016; Rakotonarivo
et al., 2018), therefore they may be unlikely to appeal against poor
implementation of standards requiring their costs to be compensated.
Previous work in Madagascar has illustrated that despite clear com-
mitments to mitigation of economic costs incurred due to the new
protected areas, compensation mandated under World Bank social
safeguards often does not reach the right people (Poudyal et al., 2016).
The third reason is the separation within organisations of those
responsible for environmental issues and those responsible for social
impacts. Biodiversity oﬀset schemes have been developed mainly by
those with environmental expertise and through a biodiversity con-
servation lens (Benabou, 2014). Our work suggests that those con-
sidering the social impacts of the development simply did not consider
the biodiversity oﬀsets (and any social impacts therefore) to come
within their remit. The fact that protected areas may bring signiﬁcant
costs to local people has been well documented (Brockington and
Wilkie, 2015; Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016; Oldekop et al., 2016). It is
important that those responsible for social impacts of developments
recognise that mitigation of costs caused by the biodiversity oﬀsets
should be considered alongside the other costs of the development.
Finally, it is clear that many of the stakeholders we interviewed see
biodiversity oﬀsets as positive actions and are unwilling to acknowl-
edge the very real potential local costs. Because the impacts of large-
scale land investments (including mining and protected areas) are ty-
pically framed based on assumptions of what the investors (government
and private sector) consider to be important, assessments of those im-
pacts may be shallow and ignore deeper implications for local com-
munities (Zoomers and Otsuki, 2017). This is a wider issue as con-
servation activities tend to be seen as positive actions by society and so
may receive reduced scrutiny relative to other activities which inﬂu-
ence the lives of remote, rural communities. While it is of course true
that the very rationale for conservation often includes the beneﬁts
which come to society from natural ecosystems (ecosystem services),
the reality is that while conservation mainly delivers regulating and
cultural services, it may prohibit the use of provisioning services and
hence result in local costs (Howe et al., 2014). It is certainly concerning
that many of those intimately involved in the design of these schemes,
which have very real impacts on local livelihoods (Bidaud et al., 2017;
Seagle, 2012), do not appear to recognise these local costs.
5. Conclusion
Biodiversity oﬀsets have rapidly expanded in popularity across the
world. The international standards which underpin their implementa-
tion in developing countries have clear commitments to avoiding local
costs through compensating for economic displacement and ensuring
special consideration of the poorest and most vulnerable. These prin-
ciples are reﬂected in relevant national policies in Madagascar, a
country with a number of high proﬁle biodiversity oﬀset projects.
Unfortunately there appears to be a signiﬁcant gap between the stan-
dards, which demonstrate high consideration of the local costs of bio-
diversity oﬀsets, and the implementation. Achieving the very high
standards laid out in the various policy documents is understandably
challenging in the context of diﬃcult access to communities, limited
economic opportunities locally due to poor connection to markets, and
a low level of literacy. However if biodiversity oﬀsets are to be a suc-
cessful addition to the conservationist’s toolkit in high biodiversity, low
income countries, then the challenges of addressing the local costs of
this novel conservation approach need to be resolved. Local costs of
biodiversity oﬀsets are not inherently diﬀerent to those arising from
traditional protected areas. The existence of stringent standards con-
cerning mitigation of local costs by companies implementing biodi-
versity oﬀsets is a very positive ﬁrst step. However, as we have shown,
companies involved in implementing oﬀsets need to recognise that
people aﬀected by biodiversity oﬀsets should be considered in the same
way as those aﬀected directly by the project. The social impacts of
oﬀsets will therefore need to be considered at a much earlier stage.
Further, we argue that lenders need to ensure capacity is in place to
ensure there is appropriate oversight to ensure commitments are met.
Future biodiversity oﬀset projects in low income countries need to work
closely with local communities from the start to eﬀectively identify
appropriate mechanisms to ensure some of the poorest people in the
world don’t bear the cost of conservation.
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